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ABSTRACT: The operations of the large mining company Yanacocha in Cajamarca (Peru) provoke and require a 
fundamental reshuffling of how rights to water are allocated, resulting in changes in the distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of accessing water. We use this paper to argue that these changes in water use and tenure 
can be understood as a form of water grabbing, since they result in a transfer of water control from farmers’ 
collectives and government agencies to the mining company, with the company also assuming de facto 
responsibility over executing water allocation and safeguarding certain water-quality levels. We illustrate – by 
using two cases: La Ramada canal and the San José reservoir – the company’s overt and covert strategies to 
achieve control over water, showing how these are often backed up by neo-liberal government policies and by 
permissive local water authorities. Next to active attempts to obtain water rights, these strategies also 
include skilfully bending and breaking the resistance of (some) farmers through negotiation and offering 
compensation. The de facto handing over of water governance powers to a multinational mining company raises 
troubling questions about longer-term water management, such as who controls the mining company, to whom 
are they accountable, and what will happen after mining operations stop. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"El Perú es un país minero" (Peru is a mining country). With this statement, pronounced during the 
opening ceremony of a water reservoir constructed by the large gold mine Yanacocha in Cajamarca in 
2008, the then president of Peru Alan Garcia underscored the government’s fondness of the mining 
industry. From the 1990s onwards, the different Peruvian governments have actively promoted mining 
as one of the cornerstones of the country’s development through state measures to attract and secure 
private and often foreign investments in mining (De Echave et al., 2009). Helped by the worldwide 
increase of mineral prices, these measures resulted in a mining boom that was particularly remarkable 
from 1999 to 2009 (IPE, 2011). According to Torres (2007) from 1990 to 2005, the sector sparked the 
development of the national economy, with global GDP rising only by 80% as compared to that of 
mining rising by 221%. 
Yanacocha, in the northern Peruvian Andes, was the first large mining investment that benefited 
from the new favourable legal and policy climate. Since its establishment, Yanacocha’s production has 
significantly contributed to making Peru one of the most important mineral producing countries in Latin 
America and worldwide (Torres, 2007). Although undeniably positive for the national trade balance, 
there is much controversy and debate about the impacts of large mining industries on the areas where 
they operate, as they provoke significant social, economic and environmental changes (Bury, 2004, 
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2005; Bebbington, 2007; Bebbington et al., 2008) which are not necessarily positive. This is why 
Bebbington et al. (2008) characterise the relationship between large mining and development as 
"contentious and ambiguous", as "mining has often delivered adverse social, environmental and 
economic effects for the many, but significant gains only for the few" and "because of the abiding sense, 
among local populations as much as development professionals, that just maybe mining could 
contribute much more" (Bebbington et al., 2008, emphasis in original text). Analysing mining as a form 
of "capitalist expansion that deeply transforms the development of those rural territories where it 
operates", Bebbington (2007) argues that a development model based on (foreign) mining companies 
has its price. "It transforms livelihoods strategies, social relations of production and forms of 
environmental governance in those territories".1  These changes and transformations do not go 
uncontested, but provoke sometimes violent resistance and reactions from civil society groups at 
different scales (local, national, international) 
The best documented impacts of mining operations on local communities are about how mines 
appropriate resources (in particular land and water) compromising livelihoods and environments. In 
this article, we focus on water, a resource that is of crucial importance for mining operations. Gold 
mines, for instance, require a large amount of water to 'wash' the soil containing gold minerals (Budds, 
2010). In addition, mining sites are often located in the catchment areas of water sources and rivers 
(Bebbington and Williams, 2008), which means that mining operations affect, and often alter, 
hydrological regimes and the quantity and quality of downstream water flows. Mines also contaminate 
water through leaching (infiltration of acids and heavy metals used for ore separation) and dumping of 
tailings (finely ground rock from which ore had been extracted). Mining operations, in sum, entail 
profound material modifications in water flows. 
In the article, we use the case of the Yanacocha mine to show that alongside producing such 
material effects, large mining operations in rural areas are also accompanied with profound and often 
irreversible changes in how water is controlled and managed. We argue that these reconfigurations of 
waterscapes provoked by mining operations can be understood as a form of water grabbing. We make 
this argument on the basis of a detailed description of what we call the politics of water grabbing, 
presenting two cases that show the mining company’s strategies to acquire control over water. We 
show how the appropriation of water by the mining company happens through long-winding and often 
somewhat shady processes of negotiation and struggle between the company, the surrounding 
communities and different government agencies. Our descriptions illustrate that both the mining 
company and the communities a) skilfully make use of the institutional and legal fuzziness and plurality 
that characterise water tenure relations in the Peruvian Andes, especially after the new Water 
Framework took effect in 2009 (del Castillo, 2009; Budds and Hinojosa, 2012) and b) also, often, resort 
to extrajudicial means for defending their claims. 
These negotiations and struggles occur in one of the poorest regions of Peru. In 2011, the Ministry of 
Finances and Economy (MEF, 2012) reported that Cajamarca presented the highest number of poor 
districts in Peru. It is a region consisting largely of rural areas and inhabited by small livestock farming 
communities. As we show, the political agency of the people in these communities is remarkable and 
many also display a deep awareness and pride of their territory and natural environment. Yet, and even 
though they are assisted by environmental NGOs (such as GRUFIDES2), their bargaining power is very 
limited as they hardly have any fallback position, making it difficult for them to say no to the financial 
compensations and favours that the mining company offers them in return for water. In terms of 
money, these compensations are enormous as compared to their normal earnings. 
The empirical material for the chapter comes from 18 months of research in the region conducted 
between 2009 and 2011 as a part of the first author’s PhD research about water management and 
mines. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants from peasant communities, the 
                                                          
1
 Our own translation. 
2
 Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible. 
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Yanacocha Company, local NGOs, water authorities at the local and national level, and local 
government offices (we anonymised their names). 
In what follows, we first briefly explain our theoretical points of departure. Before moving on to the 
description of the two cases (La Ramada canal and the San José reservoir), we provide a background of 
Yanacocha mine and water use in Cajamarca. In the last section, we draw three major conclusions 
about how mines alter waterscapes. Our cases illustrate that mining operations not only change how 
and who uses water but also reconfigure water governance, with the mining company obtaining control 
over water and assuming major responsibilities for water allocation. The longer-term impacts of these 
changes on livelihoods and environments remain poorly understood, although it is clear that the 'de-
territorialisation' of water management that it entails is irreversible. 
WATER GRABBING AND MINES: SOME THEORETICAL POINTS OF DEPARTURE 
In analogy with the definition proposed by Borras and Franco (2012) for land grabbing, we define 'water 
grabbing' as involving both changes in water use, and (perhaps more importantly) also involving 
(irreversible) changes in water tenure relations. As with land grabbing, this process involves the 
enclosure of commons by multinational companies and government agencies, dispossessing peasants 
and indigenous people and altering the environment. Our understanding of water grabbing rests on the 
concept of waterscapes. The term allows recognising how the natural and the social environments 
always co-constitute each other, and is therefore useful "to explore the ways in which flows of water, 
power and capital converge to produce uneven socio-ecological arrangements over space and time" 
(Budds and Hinojosa, 2012). 
We associate changing waterscapes through water grabbing with the so-called 'neo-liberal turn' and 
the neo-liberalisation of environmental arenas of governance, as well as with the privatisation and 
commoditisation of nature (Bakker, 2002; Fairhead et al., 2012), a stream of theoretical literature which 
focuses on the inevitable environmental dimensions of neo-liberalism, trying to understand how 
capitalism emerges through a restructuring of nature-society relationships. In particular, we use these 
insights for conceptualising water governance as a form of state re-regulation to secure capital 
accumulation, through both material and discursive means, which produce particular forms of authority 
and social order (Budds and Hinojosa, 2012). These ideas are inspired by discussions on water becoming 
a commodity (Prudham, 2009), and a necessary lubricant for capital accumulation (Budds, 2011). Our 
analysis thus suggests that the entrance of mines in waterscapes entails the introduction of market 
dynamics or market-oriented processes in water management, allocation and supply, leading to the 
commercialisation or privatisation of water management (Bakker, 2002). 
CAJAMARCA, WATER AND YANACOCHA 
Cajamarca is located in the northern Peruvian Andes, and therefore is a region characterized by 
mountains, high grassy plains and valleys.3 The capital of the department is the city of Cajamarca, 
located at 2700 MASL (meter above sea level) in an inter-Andean valley and surrounded by mountains 
of about 4000 MASL. Since hacienda times, Cajamarca has been one of the most important regions for 
livestock and dairy production in Peru (Armijos, 2005). The livelihood activities of rural households 
consist of grazing cattle, milking schedules, milk delivery and milk-related production. Small-scale 
agriculture is also part of the activities of the region, which depends on irrigation. Irrigation is mainly 
done with water from streams and sources located in the high mountains which are channelled to the 
                                                          
3
 This region is historically notorious because in 1532 it was here that the Inca Atahualpa was captured and murdered by the 
Spanish conqueror, Francisco Pizarro. History tells us that Atahualpa offered one room full of gold and two with silver in 
exchange for his freedom. The Spanish accepted the offer; however, once the rooms were totally full and the time had arrived 
to acknowledge the agreement, Pizarro decided to not release Atahualpa, but instead killed him (Sarmiento and Ravines, 2009). 
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agricultural fields through a network of rudimentary canals. To manage these irrigation canals – i.e. 
distributing the available water supply, establishing the delivery turns and organising maintenance work 
– the peasants organise themselves in water user associations. These associations take decisions 
collectively or in consultation with the community general assembly. They are also responsible for 
formally registering their association’s members and the water sources that they use. Rights to water – 
permits, licences or authorisations – are registered in the names of these associations, and it is also the 
responsibility of the associations to renew such water rights. When water is also used for other 
purposes next to irrigation, the rights specify this. Not all associations have their records, rights and 
registrations in order. 
In the mid-1990s Cajamarca gained importance as a significant contributor to the national economy, 
due to the operations of a large gold mine, Yanacocha (established in 1993). According to the Ministry 
of Energy and Mining, Cajamarca is the second most important region – of the 12 Peruvian Andean 
regions – in terms of mining concessions, particularly for gold, silver and copper production (Luna 
Córdova, 2009). In 2008, about 40.88% of Cajamarca’s territory was given out for mining concessions 
(Grufides, n.d.). For the last 10 years, in the Cajamarca region, at least 10 transnational mining projects 
have been implemented and developed by transnational and national investors. Yanacocha is very 
prominent among these. It is the largest gold producer in Latin America and one of the most profitable 
mining enterprises in the world (Bury, 2005). It is a surface or open pit mine,4 consisting of six open pits, 
four heap leaching pads or platforms and three gold recovering plants (Elizalde et al., 2007). The 
company is a joint venture owned by Newmont Mining Corporation (USA), the Buenaventura Mining 
Company (Peru), and the financial sector of the World Bank5 (Kuramoto, 1999; Bury, 2005; De Echave et 
al., 2009). Since its establishment, the production of Yanacocha has exceeded 26 million ounces 
(Newmont, n.d.). In 2008 and 2009, Yanacocha produced 1.81 and 2.06 million ounces, respectively, 
making corresponding profits of about US$ 1.6 billion and 2.1 billion (Yanacocha, 2009). The mine 
constitutes the "first large-scale heap leaching project in Peru" and is "the largest heap-leaching 
operation in the world" (Bury, 2005). 
As Yanacocha itself states: "[t]he development of our activities requires water. [We] accumulate 
water from rainfall, surface and groundwater [extraction] and drainage, to use them in our operations" 
(Yanacocha, 2009). The process of obtaining gold consists of the removal of large amounts of soil 
deposited in the pads or platforms. This soil is then constantly irrigated by a cyanide solution (50 mg per 
litre of water) which dissolves the gold, and through pipe systems this gold-containing liquid is pumped 
to the processing plants where the gold is recovered (Yanacocha, n.d.). Hence, for producing gold, 
Yanacocha requires a permanent supply of water (Yanacocha, 2009). According to its annual report of 
2009, the total amount that entered into its productive process in that year was about 33 Mm3,6 most 
of which reportedly came from groundwater sources (Yanacocha, 2009). All the water used by 
Yanacocha’s operations is (in principle) stored in a reservoir constructed for this purpose, where the 
water is treated before it is released to the surrounding communities. 
The mine, however, does not just require water for its operations but also alters water flows 
because its site is located in the headwaters of five of the main rivers of the Cajamarca region 
(Yanacocha, 2008), hence also at the place where many sources and streams feeding irrigation channels 
are located. According to the reports of the mining company, there are about 9,330 farmers´ families 
living in the area influenced by the mining company (Yanacocha, 2007a). During the operations on the 
open pits, groundwater sources are removed in a process called 'dewatering'. According to one of the 
mine’s managers, this water is not necessary or useful, "it is a burden"7 and hampers operations, which 
                                                          
4
 The operations are established from 3500 to 4100 masl; 48 km north of the city of Cajamarca and 800 km north of the capital 
city (Golder Associates, 2008). 
5
 About the shareholding: Newmont 51%, Buenaventura 44% and World Bank holds 5%.  
6
 Mm
3
 = million cubic metres. 
7
 Translated from Spanish: "El agua ahí es mas un estorbo" (Mining manager 1, 2010)  
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is why it needs to be pumped or removed. This dewatering process has enormous implications for the 
downstream waterscape: lowering groundwater levels, altering the flows of rivers and creeks and even 
making entire upstream lakes disappear. There are also repercussions for the operation of existing 
downstream hydraulic networks, for instance, irrigation systems (Younger et al., 2004). 
Besides dewatering, the extraction of water is accompanied by capturing and draining of surface 
water, from small lakes and water springs. This is done to secure operations on the pit and to prevent 
acid mine drainage. This is the result of a chemical reaction that can occur when removed metal 
sulphides exposed during the soil removal enter into contact with surface water (i.e. from rainfall of 
surface sources) and air (oxygen). 
According to Yanacocha, most of the water that it uses is treated and recycled. In one of its 
sustainability reports, the mine states that its water use for 2009 amounted to 125,100 Mm3. The 
report claims that 98% of this amount was reused and recycled, and that therefore only 2% was actually 
consumed in mining operations. According to the mine, therefore, its actual consumption of water: 2 
Mm3 is negligible compared to the amount used by agriculture – in the 5 catchment areas – which is 
estimated to be about 68 Mm3 (Yanacocha, 2009; Yanacocha, n.d.). Indeed, Yanacocha uses such 
figures to boast of its environmental awareness. Yanacocha’s focus on net consumption, however, is 
misleading as it obscures the impacts of Yanacocha’s operations on the quality and quantity of 
downstream water flows. In an attempt to arrive at more accurate figures that do take these impacts 
into account, Preciado (2012) analysed Yanacocha’s water use in the framework of a river basin. She 
estimates Yanacocha’s yearly use to be around 34 Mm3 instead of only 2 Mm3. The author calculated 
this quantity considering consumed water by mining operations (2 Mm3) and extracted groundwater 
(32 Mm3). In her analysis, Preciado (2012) highlights that there are extra amounts of water that are 
involved in the mining operations, but they are not quantified such as drainage water from surface 
water sources and the amounts of water that, in the long term, are taken from the watershed because 
of mining operations in the area. 
Yanacocha covers an area of about 10,000 ha in three main districts of Cajamarca: La Encañada, 
Baños del Inca and Cajamarca. This large mining site is adjacent to around 100 peasant communities. 
The national land titling and registration programme (PETT8) initiated in 1992 by the Peruvian 
government, largely in line with the ideas of de Soto (de Soto, 2000), greatly facilitated Yanacocha’s 
acquisition of land; once land titles were registered through the PETT process, they could also be 
transferred and sold (to the mining company). Evidencing its interests in the matter, Yanacocha even 
actively supported parts of the PETT process, by helping the clarification of the land status and legal 
ownership through "rapid land-titling initiatives in communities" (Bury, 2005). 
Yanacocha acquired most of its land by direct purchase, and some through negotiations. The direct 
purchases or plot negotiations were done between Yanacocha representatives and the landowners. 
With hindsight, many involved feel that Yanacocha obtained land at very low prices (for example 
US$25/ha) (Deza, 2008). Land transactions were the cause of several socio-environmental conflicts 
between Yanacocha and the inhabitants of neighbouring communities. In case a landowner refused to 
sell or did not want to negotiate, the mine would take actions to have the plot expropriated by force, 
making use of the 'ley de servidumbre', or right of way. Such land was registered as "property acquired 
during rebellious resistance" (SCG, 2004). 
Through its acquisition of large portions of land, Yanacocha de facto appropriated the means of 
subsistence and production of many people in the area. According to many of them, this comes with 
responsibilities: they feel that Yanacocha should be creating employment and provide assistance to 
those deprived of their land. The families’ perception was that "the work replaces the land. It is not a 
gift, it is our right", so it must be considered as permanent and inherited (SCG, 2004). 
                                                          
8
 Programa Especial de Titulación de Tierras (PETT), which was created and implemented to promote the formalisation of 
property rights in rural areas. This is to provide land titles to farmers and in that way to support their private landownership.  
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In what follows, we provide detailed descriptions of two specific sets of encounters between the 
mining company and the surrounding communities about water. 
Case 1: La Ramada Canal 
In this first case, we illustrate the strategies of the mine to gain access to, and control of, water from a 
particular set of sources (in the Cerro Negro mountain) which used to feed the La Ramada canal, a canal 
used by farmers to irrigate their fields, about 247 ha of agricultural crops like potatoes, barley, wheat, 
among others. The beneficiaries of this canal were two communities from the rural town La Ramada: La 
Ramada and Manzanas, located in the sub-catchment area from the Porcón and Maschón rivers. 
The canal La Ramada was constructed in the 1980s, under the enthusiastic leadership of Don 
Eusebio Yopla. He organised the farmers to collectively work on its construction, a tremendous effort 
which took a long time, from 1982 to 1986. It was a tiresome and difficult process, because of the 
roughness of the terrain and the remoteness of the water sources. Many comuneros still vividly recall 
the hardships they faced when building their canal: "[w]e walked for hours very early in the morning to 
reach the sources and worked the entire day" (Farmers 1, 2009). Once the canal was built, Don Eusebio 
also took the lead in officially registering it, so as to formally establish the water rights of the involved 
comuneros. In 1989, the Cerro Negro-La Ramada canal of 17 km of length was officially registered and 
got state water rights licences. These were issued by the General Water Directory of the Ministry of 
Agriculture to the water users of the La Ramada and Manzanas communities (Ministerio de Agricultura, 
1989). These water rights authorised the members of these communities to use the water from a group 
of natural springs located in the Cerro Negro area.9 Some of these springs are located in the Cajamarca 
watersheds, while others are in the Jequetepeque watersheds. The water flows given were about 13 
litres per second (l/s) to irrigate 247 ha of agricultural land. Logically, Don Eusebio also became the first 
president of the water user association of the La Ramada canal. 
These Cerro Negro water sources which feed the canal are located on the land that was later 
purchased by Yanacocha, soon after it started its operations in the area in 1993. Yanacocha bought this 
land from the Granja Porcón, which is an evangelical farming cooperative that was established (and had 
received its land) as a result of the Land Reform of 1969 (Granja Porcón, n.d.). This cooperative owns 
about 11,000 ha in Cajamarca and its relationship with Yanacocha is one of friendly comradeship. 
Yanacocha also wanted to be able to use the riparian (adjacent) waters, including those from Cerro 
Negro, as a source of drinking water for one of its mining camp sites, La Pajuela. In 2003, Yanacocha 
applied and got the official water rights10 to use 8.5 l/s from the Cerro Negro water sources. These 
rights were issued by the water authority of Jequetepeque, Administración técnica del distrito de riego 
del Jequetepeque ATDRJ (ATDRJ, 2003). As part of the requirement to apply for water rights and to 
reinforce its application, Yanacocha presented its land titles to prove that the water sources were 
located within its private property. 
The members of the Canal Ramada water user association were not aware of the fact that their 
rights to water had been transferred. In 2002, a group of some ten comuneros got together and 
travelled to the catchment area to clean parts of the canal. To do this, they had to enter the area that 
now belonged to the mine. Yanacocha discovered this, and accused the farmers of trespassing and 
denounced them to the Crime prevention office of the Cajamarca court (DJ-Cajamarca, 2002). To the 
farmers’ surprise, Yanacocha also stated that the farmers’ use of the Cerro Negro water sources and the 
canal was illegal, since (according to the mine) their rights to these waters had been officially revoked. 
The court decided not to take any actions against the farmers, because there had not been any violence, 
nor had any private property been damaged. 
                                                          
9
 The sources and water flows were as follows: Rumi rumi 3 l/s; Cuyoc 3 l/s; located at the Jequetepeque watershed and Perga 
Perga 7 l/s located at the Cajamarca watershed. 
10
 The details of the water sources and flows given are: Rumi rumi 1: 1 l/s, Rumi rumi 2: 0.20 l/s, Rumi rumi 3: 2 l/s, Cuyoc 1: 1 
l/s, Cuyoc 2: 1.50 l/s, Cuyoc 3: 1 l/s, Quebrada Cuyoc: 2 l/s, Pampa Cuyoc 1: 0.15 l/s and Pampa Cuyoc 2: 3 l/s.  
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It was through this incident that the farmers found out that there was something wrong, and they 
started inquiring about the status of their water rights and their canal. They soon found out that Don 
Eusebio, their charismatic leader, had arranged for the cancellation of their rights. In 2001, he had 
(together with another leader of la Ramada) presented a petition to the ATDRC (the Administración 
Técnica del Distrito de Riego de Cajamarca) to cancel the communities’ rights to water. The reasons he 
gave for this request were that the water flows and the canal were no longer in use, and that the canal 
was damaged because of leakages. In addition, he mentioned the fact that "in La Ramada, Yanacocha is 
already executing programs of provision and improvement of drinking water systems", supposedly 
indicating that the Ramada and Manzanas communities would, in the future, access water through 
these systems. Don Eusebio had undertaken this action entirely on his own account, and without 
informing the other members of the La Ramada water user association. In response to Don Eusebio’s 
request, the ATDRC – based on the water law 1775211 – revoked the water rights for irrigation given to 
the La Ramada and Manzanas water users. Their main arguments to do this were: the lack of 
maintenance and cleaning of the canal for about 4 years; the fact that the users’ register was not 
updated; and the failure of the users to pay water fees (ATDRC, 2001). 
Why had Don Eusebio initiated this process? His relatives – and in particular his grandsons – 
speculate that he was approached by Yanacocha. They think the mine may have offered him money to 
help pay for his medicines, in return for which he had to make sure the canal was abandoned to allow 
for the rights attached to it to be cancelled. Another water user likewise thinks that "the mine paid him 
little by little to stop organising users for the canal maintenance work" (Farmer 2, 2009). The water 
users all state that Don Eusebio had been acting entirely on his own account, and not as the president 
of the canal. They emphasised that they had not been aware of the cancellation. Of course, the official 
cancellation of the rights of the La Ramada and Manzanas users was indeed convenient to the mine, as 
it allowed the company to formally acquire these rights, which happened in 2003. 
Although there are no precise measurements, it is clear that the loss of the La Ramada canal did 
significantly reduce farmers’ access to water. People interviewed agreed that there was less water, and 
that this was becoming an ever more serious problem with the population of the communities 
increasing.12 As one farmer observed: "before we could irrigate for about 12 hours every 45 days but, 
after the water decreased, we irrigate less than 3 hours and using only water from [surrounding] 
canals" (Farmers 2, 2009). Some users indicated that they had changed their cropping pattern because 
of the reduced availability of water, and were now only irrigating pastures to at least be able keep their 
livestock production. 
The story, however, does not end with Don Eusebio’s action. Some of the affected farmers got 
together and (in 2004) filed an official complaint with the Regional Agrarian Office from the Ministry of 
Agriculture (DRA, 2004). Their story was treated seriously, and the Office enacted a resolution in 
support of the peasants’ claims. The resolution recognised the existence and legitimacy of the La 
Ramada canal and the assigned water rights given to the peasants in 1989. Before arriving at this 
conclusion, the Office had carefully analysed how the cancelation of the water rights could have 
happened. Their conclusion was that the process of cancellation was not legally valid, because the canal 
leader had not acted on behalf of the water users, and had not properly notified or informed them. 
Yanacocha’s reaction to the resolution was clear: they dismissed it by questioning the authority of 
the Regional Agrarian Office to deal with water rights. According to the mine, water should be dealt 
with by water authorities, the ATDRs. The mine’s view of the matter was that the canal and its water 
rights were cancelled because they had not been used since 1997. To further lend support to its own 
                                                          
11
 Article 116, section about cancellation of water rights (Water Law, 1969). 
12
 For drinking water purposes the perception was the same: no enough water to satisfy the population needs. The president 
of the drinking water system said that they suffer of water shortage; they only have water in the mornings from 8:00 to 11:00 
hours. He stated that the problem was not their reservoir nor the distribution system, but the fact that there is less water in 
the area for the growing population (Representative drinking water, 2007). 
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position, Yanacocha did everything it could to question the very existence of the canal La Ramada. The 
mining company for instance produced maps which showed that the canal was seriously damaged and 
interrupted at several places, and therefore could not have conducted water. In the words of one of the 
mine’s managers (Mining manager 1, 2010), the canal was no more than a large hole. Also, to disqualify 
the canal and its users, in its documents the mine referred to the "auto-nominated users of the 
supposed canal La Ramada" (Mining engineer, 2010). In the reasoning of Yanacocha representatives, 
the farmers "do not really want water or do not really struggle for that, instead, what they want is 
money" or "to have an excuse to engage in negotiation with the mine, because of the economic 
benefits they might get" (Mining manager 2, 2009). 
Between 2003 and 2004 and convinced of its own rightness, Yanacocha also actively destroyed a 
stretch of almost 5 km of canal. When they learned about this from the farmers, the Regional Agrarian 
Office declared that the mine had acted against the water law, which states that nobody can obstruct 
or impede a right of way because they belong to the state. Any alterations or modifications therefore 
require the prior approval of the state. After having inspected the damage in 2004, the Office ordered 
Yanacocha to rehabilitate and fix the damaged stretch of canal. 
This trouble with the Regional Office may have prompted the mine to change its strategy. Rather 
than continuing to attempt to gain control over the Cerro Negro waters through legal means, the 
company instead decided to enter into a process of negotiations with the water users. In October 2004, 
the mine succeeded in gathering a group of about 150 people from the La Ramada and Manzanas 
communities agreeing to negotiate. This group not only consisted of members of the La Ramada water 
user association, but also included users from a neighbouring canal and even counted some people who 
were not registered as water users. The mining company, in an attempt to once and for all end the 
troubles and disputes about the Cerro Negro waters, offered some money to the community members; 
this money was to compensate them for the work done on the construction of the 17 km of the canal 
stretching from the Cerro Negro area to the community of La Ramada. The amount each farmer would 
receive was substantial: 7000 PEN (Peruvian Nuevos Soles), equalling approximately US$2000 
(Transacción extrajudicial, 2004). The company even offered those who had never used the water a 
sum of PEN55,350, supposedly (and as stated in the written agreement) because they had contributed 
to the maintenance of the canal. These amounts of money are huge for the inhabitants of the two 
communities; representing four times the average income of US$509/year – that a peasant could get in 
1995 (INEI, 1997) or more than an entire annual income of someone working in the town of Cajamarca 
in 2008 and 2009 for a minimum wage (about PEN550/month) (INEI, 2010). For many of them, 
therefore, the offer of the mine was difficult to resist. 
Yet, by accepting Yanacocha’s money, people also explicitly agreed that the mine had adequately 
compensated them for any damage or loss they might experience as a result of the closure of the canal 
or as a result of the transfer of water rights to Yanacocha. Upon receiving the money, people also 
formally recognised the validity of the mine’s water rights (and thus agreed that their own rights were 
no longer valid), and accepted the closure of La Ramada canal. The agreement signed upon the handing 
over of the money also stipulated that those who had received money would renounce from any action 
which would negatively affect the rights given to Yanacocha. The agreement allowed Yanacocha to 
empathically assert that the farmers did no longer have legitimate claim to water or to water rights 
(Yanacocha, 2007b). 
The agreement also worked to divide the community members, with those who had accepted the 
money (and in particular those among them who had never been users of water) now taking the side of, 
and defending, the mine and its actions, for instance by supporting the mine’s claim that the canal had 
never conducted water or, the mine never blocked the canal. According to La Ramada inhabitants, 
these people were paid by the mine to do this, as "the intention of the mine was to delete any trace of 
the canal" (Yopla, 2009). The people siding with the mine also forcefully prevented others from 
entering the area where the canal is situated. They even stopped representatives of the water authority 
when they passed by to inspect the canal condition. An aggressive farmer explained: "that he does not 
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bother the authorities at their offices, why they then have to bother him in his property" (Farmer 3, 
2010). 
There are also many people who maintain that water can and should never be exchanged for money. 
They therefore argue that if people accepted cash, this just represents compensation for work done on 
the canal or for damages suffered. But: "it was not selling our water" nor the rights to water or to the 
infrastructure (Farmers 2, 2009). Some of La Ramada leaders also question the legal validity of the 
agreement, because it was co-signed by people who had never been water users and who had no 
relation whatsoever with the canal. According to Emilio Yopla – the grandson of Don Eusebio, and a 
current leader in La Ramada – this agreement represented nothing else than buying users and thus 
buying water: "this was more than a payment for labour devoted to the canal. It was a transaction to 
force us to give up our water sources, the canal and the water flows".13 Determined to defend their 
territory and livelihoods, Emilio and another leader (Anatacio Yopla) approached14 the water authorities 
of Cajamarca and Jequetepeque – ATDRC and ATDRJ, respectively – with the request to cancel the 
water rights given to Yanacocha. Their argument was that the mine was using the water for mining 
purposes rather than for the intended drinking water purposes, thus violating the priorities for water 
use as established in the Water Law 17752 (Water Law, 1969). Their requests were dismissed by the 
authorities, on account of the fact that Yanacocha used the assigned water for drinking water of its 
camp site (ATDRJ, 2008; IRH, 2008). 
Yanacocha refused to talk with the leaders, stating that they did not legitimately represent any 
community or group of water users. The mining company even qualified Emilio’s communications as 
hidden threats against the mine, and warned that they would report him to the Cajamarca court of 
justice in case he would undertake any further action. In 2008, Emilio organised a public protest, 
blocking the road that connects the mine site with the city of Cajamarca. The intention of this protest 
was to demand a solution and to call the attention of the media and the authorities. Instead, he was 
accused of causing public disturbance and of aggression against the private property of Yanacocha and 
brought to court. 
The disputes and arguments continue until today, involving different factions in the involved 
communities and different government authorities. In 2006, the Ministry of Agriculture, commanded a 
study to determine the feasibility of the canal and the water availability in the area. Its objective would 
be to "give water rights – in priority – to those who were affected because of the expiration of such 
rights" (Ministerio de Agricultura, 2006). With this document, the leaders approached the two regional 
water authorities – ATRDC and ATRDJ – asking them to follow up. In 2009, and following what the 
Ministry had asked, the National Water Authority – Autoridad Nacional del Agua (ANA) hired an 
independent consultant to do those studies. The conclusions (in 2010) stated that water demands 
exceeded water availability from May until November, but that the surplus water of the other months 
could be made available to farmers. The consultant’s report also declared that La Ramada canal was not 
operational, and in urgent need of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and maintenance work. Among other 
suggestions, the report proposed the construction of a reservoir to store and supply water to the canal, 
and the installation of a sprinkler irrigation system. 
Yanacocha disputed the study’s results, and in particular questioned the calculated figures for water 
availability. It stated that "decisions that can be taken on the basis of [those studies] can have 
irreversible effects on the property rights of Minera Yanacocha" (Yanacocha, 2010). In spite of this, the 
ANA (2011) and the local-level water authorities decided in favour of the famers, by approving a 
designated water flow15 for La Ramada of 1.37 l/s from May to September. The authorities also stated 
that the users needed to make some provisions to regulate and store water in the rainy season, from 
October to April, and ordered La Ramada water association to rehabilitate the canal within a year’s time. 
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 Judicial demand presented by Emilio Yopla to the Court of Justice from the Jequetepeque region.  
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 These two leaders disagreed with each other on many other accounts.  
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 Water availability of about 2.23 Mm
3
/year. 
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Although positive in principle for those who wanted to claim their water, the resolution by itself does 
not provide them with rights to water, nor does it allow them to construct new infrastructure. 
Rehabilitating the canal or constructing new reservoirs might turn out to be difficult, as some of those 
would have to be located on the property of Yanacocha. That the mining company will not be 
forthcoming shows in the fact that they already made a legal appeal against the ANA resolution 
(Defensoría del Pueblo, 2011). 
Case 2: The San José Reservoir 
In this second case, we describe another series of encounters between Yanacocha and its neighbouring 
communities about water. Like in the La Ramada case, here also the mining company resorted to 
negotiations and the payment of compensations to resolve the problems and secure its unlimited 
access to, and control over, the upstream water sources. 
The activities of the Yanacocha mine in 2000 and 2003 in one of its open pits led to severe changes 
in the soil cover (due to erosion and compaction), while also significantly altering downstream water 
flows by disrupting the existing drainage networks and lowering the water table. Because of 
percolations during the expansion phase of the platforms at the Cerro Yanacocha and La Quinua areas, 
water quality was also compromised. In addition (at the end of 2006), there were some accidents with 
the spillover of acid water that reached the communities. The mining company qualified most of these 
environmental impacts of their operations as moderate (MWH PERU, 2006). 
However, for water users downstream, the impact was significant, as two of the creeks that 
experienced a reduction in water flows were feeding five irrigation canals. One of those canals was 
constructed in 1953 through the collective work of 30 farmers, who had also arranged for its 
registration with the water authority and who together looked after its operation, cleaning and 
maintenance. After Yanacocha started its open pits in the two mentioned areas, the five canals only 
received a fraction of the water flow that they used to have. For example, in one case the water flow 
dropped from 80 l/s to 56 l/s and in another from 500 l/s to about 100 l/s. The affected communities 
complained against Yanacocha and demanded to have their water sources back. According to these 
communities, the impact on the two creeks and the reduction of water in their canals were not 
mentioned as the impacts of Yanacocha’s operations in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
that was approved in 1998. 
In its annual reports, Yanacocha admitted that the initial operations in its pits could lead to a 
reduction of downstream water flows. As a solution, the company proposed getting water from 
another area – a complex of natural springs or lakes – by constructing a dam to store water, which 
could then be diverted to the affected communities. However, the communities surrounding those 
springs opposed these plans, as they feared the loss of their own waters. The mine then came up with a 
mitigation and compensation plan, in which it proposed to provide the affected communities with 
treated water from the mine. The proposal was that Yanacocha would collect the remaining or residual 
water it had used in its mining processes, next to harvesting or collecting rainwater. Before this water 
could be released to the affected communities, it had to be treated. As part of this plan, Yanacocha 
constructed the San José reservoir,16 in an old open pit, with a storage capacity of 6 Mm3 of water. This 
water would be used by the mine itself, and could also be delivered to the communities. By thus 
releasing water, Yanacocha intended to replace the water lost because of its operations. 
The quality of the treated water was such that it could only be used for irrigation and not for 
consumption or other domestic uses. This was why many community members were not too happy 
about the mine’s proposal. Many people did not want treated water; they expected to receive what 
they called 'natural' water, as they always had. However, as one farmer leader indicated: "the only 
alternative was the one proposed by Yanacocha, so they gave us treated water" (Farmer 4, 2011). 
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Affected users expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the mine’s water: "*Our+ water sources and 
flows were natural before [the mine arrived], and we were drinking that water and using it for irrigation, 
as well as for our animals. Water was consumed without any fear" (Farmers 3, 2011). Some of the 
affected communities refused to use the treated water; they protested, and entered into a long judicial 
process against the mine, to demand a continued access to 'natural' water. However, they were not 
successful17 and finally had to agree to receive treated water. 
During 2006 and 2007 and as a part of the mitigation and compensation plan, the communities and 
the mine signed extrajudicial agreements.18 The first condition for receiving treated water was that the 
communities had to give up their former water rights,19 the ones issued by the ATDRC, over the sources 
and flows located in the area where Yanacocha is operating. They were requested to apply for new 
water rights. In their applications for new rights, the communities specifically had to indicate that they 
are aware of, and willing to receive, treated water from the San Jose Reservoir. Through this process, 
the former communities’ water rights were thus returned to the State administration, allowing 
Yanacocha to obtain them and proceed with its operations. 
The process itself was contentious and full of questionable incidences, like the reduction of water 
amounts in the new licences given to the communities. The ATDRC issued new water rights with the 
quantities that users would be entitled to, even before the official agreement had been signed. For 
example, one of the canals that used to receive about 500 l/s now only received a licence for 100 l/s 
(Community advisor, 2011). The presidents of these water user associations had diligently followed the 
requested procedure, thereby giving up their former water rights and applying for new ones from the 
San José reservoir.20 The new water rights stipulating amounts and sources, as issued by the water 
authority, indicated for example: "this canal will conduct 56 l/sec of treated water and 29 l/sec from 
natural sources, rounding up to 85 l/sec to benefit about 230 water users, mainly agricultural families" 
(ALA-C, 2009). 
What is also remarkable is the relative eagerness and ease with which the peasant leaders believed, 
and agreed to, the mine’s discourse about the viability and sustainability of the reservoir. This can 
perhaps be explained by the fact that they did not have any alternative means of getting water. Also – 
as rumours have it – some of them may have accepted small bribes and favours from the mine 
(Community advisor, 2011, 2012). A statement from one affected peasant water user association which 
signed an agreement with Yanacocha illustrates the ease with which they went along with the mine’s 
proposals: 
[t]he water users agreed to renew our previous request about the nullity of our water rights issued by the 
water authority on 2004 [ATDRC, 2004a]. The permit gave us the right to use 63.28 l/s for agriculture and 
livestock production, benefiting 70 farmer families… Currently our water user association does not use this 
given water flow. On the contrary, it is convenient for us to use water from the San José reservoir owned by 
the Yanacocha mining company, which is supplied by treated water from the mining operations. The 
agreement with this company is to receive 42 l/sec from its reservoir into our canal and 21.28 l/sec from 
the other natural springs… We also ask for the closing of the aqueduct of our canal and its right of way (700 
m) and we give the permission to Yanacocha to use this part of the canal and land for the its own purposes 
with the condition of receiving water from San José
21
 (Community Act, 2008; Solicitud, 2008). 
The net result was a relatively smooth handing over of water rights from peasant associations to the 
mine, with the former giving up their previous water rights licences and rights over infrastructure and 
accepting new rights from the reservoir. Also, through these agreements and with the full 
acknowledgment and authorisation of the state water authorities, Yanacocha became the de facto 
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 ATDRC, 2004a, 2004b.  
20
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water provider for five peasant canals, supplying water to about 1000 users. The mine is responsible for 
releasing and allocating a total amount of about 3 Mm3, especially during the irrigation period from 
April to September. To assume its new duties as a water manager for the region, the mine temporally 
hires some workers from the affected communities. These workers, however, just operate the 
installations following the technical and operational instructions from the mine and have nothing to say 
about how or when water is released or allocated. Formally, the water authority remains in charge of 
establishing how much water each of the canals should receive. However, from the time the mine has 
taken over water provision and distribution, there has been no involvement whatsoever from the water 
authorities in terms of instructions or inspections. 
The agreement between the mining company and the affected communities also stipulated that the 
company would compensate the communities in financial terms for giving up their water rights. Already, 
although not meant as direct compensation, the mine was financing various investment projects such 
as the construction of schools and roads to communities, the implementation of drinking water systems, 
reforestation, and employment. The more direct compensations make the transactions between the 
communities and the mine closely resemble a water market, in spite of the fact that the Water Law 
29338 (Water Resources Law, 2009) expressly forbids water trading. Yanacocha paid about US$30,000 
to every user of a community of about 230 users. Comparing the compensations given in 2006 with the 
income of peasant families, the amounts are equal to ten times the minimum income, about US$200, of 
what an urban worker in Cajamarca (in 2008 and 2009) could earn (INEI, 2010). In addition, the mine 
established a trust fund aimed at guaranteeing the continued operation and maintenance of the San 
José reservoir once mining operations are finished, by 2018. This fund is about US$2.9 million 
(Agreement, 2009). However it is not clearly defined how and by whom this fund will be managed, and 
in particular whether actual water users will be involved or trained to do that. 
Not all affected communities entered into negotiations with the mine, or signed the agreement. 
Some communities that were affected as well did not receive any attention because they refused to 
receive treated water. Others who were also affected lacked the necessary documents to prove their 
water use, flows and official water rights, which is why their complaints were dismissed by the mine 
and the water authorities. 
The implementation of Yanacocha’s proposal to deliver treated water to the affected communities 
implied a shift in the responsibility for water allocation. Now, this responsibility came to lie with the 
mining company. To the people receiving water, it was unclear how allocation would happen and who 
would monitor and control this. They thus requested the water authority, ATDRC, to assume this task 
by checking how Yanacocha released water. ATDRC never did this; it just issued water rights or licences 
to the communities, allowing them to use water from the reservoir, and to the mine for providing water. 
De facto, the mine thus controls how water is used and allocated, and it does this without informing or 
being checked by the users of the water authority: "the only one which knows and controls is 
Yanacocha"22 (Former employee, 2010). That users do not know how and if they can hold the mine 
accountable for its water services is also shown in the fact that for about 2 years, (2010-2012) the 
reservoir has not been functioning. Against the agreement, Yanacocha is therefore releasing water 
directly from its La Quinua treatment plant. To date, the water authorities have not done anything to 
hold Yanacocha to its promises, and to have the reservoir repaired. Yet, the current local water 
authority of Cajamarca, is critical of how water management is changing in the region: 
Water has become an element of pressure and negotiation,… in some places where mines impacted 
people, they paid to avoid more problems. It is a mistake *from the mines+ to proceed like this,… because 
when negotiation take place, it is very difficult to approach [water related] problems from a different 
perspective… I criticised that both, the mine and the communities, negotiate with resources that are not 
yours (Puicán, 2010). 
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In 2009, the ATDRC23 decided to enact a resolution acknowledging the negotiations between the 
communities and the mine: 
Yanacocha, a private mining company that developed exploration and exploitation activities, between 2000 
and 2002 and since that time there is not water flow of about 56 l/sec in an irrigation canal that used to 
come from two water creeks [nearby mining operations]. Because of the extraction of groundwater and 
surface water in the open pit, the water level has reduced *and the canals cannot take it+… Now the water 
flows from these creeks are captured by Yanacocha and constitute part of its mining operations. [After a 
treatment process done by the mine, this water] is finally stored in the San José reservoir. Because of the 
impacts on those [flows] and with the purpose to guarantee water provision to the canal, Yanacocha 
constructed the San José reservoir to store water and then provide it in a controlled basis during dry 
seasons (ALA-C, 2009). 
This statement was part of the new resolutions that the water authority enacted to the affected canals 
issuing their new water rights over water flows from the San José reservoir. 
Yanacocha proudly mentions this plan in its annual reports as reflecting its contributions to local 
water management (Yanacocha, 2009). During the opening of the reservoir, in 2008, the former 
President Alan García also celebrated and congratulated the initiative from the mine. He emphasised 
that such private-sector initiatives were crucial also for the further development of agriculture, and he 
mentioned the reservoir as an example. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis elicits three important conclusions. One, large-scale mining operations such as that of 
Yanacocha entail major shifts in how water is used, owned and managed. Perhaps different from how 
most land grabbing occurs, the shifts in these cases do not occur through the open and outright sale of 
water. Instead, they involve long-winding, fuzzy and opaque processes of negotiation and sometimes 
struggle on a playing field that is far from level, with the political and financial powers of mining 
companies far outweighing those of the local peasant and indigenous communities. The net effect 
nevertheless is a thorough reconfiguration of water governance, with the mining company controlling 
water in the region and local communities being effectively dispossessed by losing their water rights. 
Second, these shifts in water use and tenure relations imply an irreversible transfer over the control 
of water from local communities and government agencies to a large and wealthy private transnational 
corporation. This transfer not only occurs through the company’s acquisition of water rights but also 
through its de facto responsibility of releasing and allocating the upstream water sources to 
downstream users. The mining company partly 'earned' the power to do this by making huge 
investments in hydraulic infrastructure, such as the San José reservoir. As La Ramada case shows, this 
creation of hydraulic property may go accompanied with the material and discursive destruction of 
existing hydraulic properties. The damage to, and blocking of, a canal constructed by farmers, and the 
active denial of its very existence were clear strategies of the mine to assert its control over the waters 
in its area of operation. In this sense, what happens in Yanacocha resembles a form of primitive 
accumulation, with water that used to be publicly or collectively owned becoming enclosed into private 
ownership by expelling existing claimants (Hartsock, 2006). However, and different from many other 
documented cases of primitive accumulation (for instance in reports of land grabbing), the 
appropriation of water in these cases is a subtle process, with its implicit privatisation serving the 
extraction of gold rather than water itself becoming a commodity. In the Yanacocha case, this involves a 
partly implicit process as formal rights to transfer water continue to be vested in the regional water 
authorities. However, in actual fact and practice, these authorities leave all responsibilities and powers 
to the company who thus becomes the de facto water management authority. The troubling question 
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of course is how this company, whose actions are guided by transnational trade relations and capital 
flows rather than by localised questions of environments and livelihoods, can and will be held 
accountable for its actions. 
And third, the impacts of these changes in water use and control are potentially devastating for local 
livelihoods and for future water availability. Water previously used for irrigating pastures and growing 
subsistence crops is now increasingly used for producing gold for export, an activity the local gains of 
which are likely to be short-lived, in spite of the enormous contributions of the mining company to local 
development. The mining company indeed destroys an existing waterscape. The longer-term social and 
environmental impacts of this remain poorly understood as yet. What is generally clear, however, is 
that many people in the rural areas of Cajamarca are left in an even more persuasive condition of 
vulnerability than they were before the arrival of the mine. This may suggest that for mining companies, 
the place and the resources are useful, but the people are not – turning them into "a surplus 
population" (Li, 2009). On the other hand, the entrance of Yanacocha has opened up new opportunities 
for civic action, protest and resistance and has triggered new ways for indigenous groups to assert their 
rights and claim environmental justice (e.g. Perreault, 2006). The La Ramada case is still unresolved. 
This shows the mining company does not automatically win and that those farmers who are still 
struggling may yet succeed in re-claiming their water rights. 
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